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SPECIAL DMSION AGONISTES
JOHN Q. BARRETI
I. AMONG THE CASUALTIES...
When the independent counsel law sank earlier this year, the casualties
included a special "division" of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit 1 This division was the special court that Congress
had, by statute, created "for the purpose of appointing independent counsels."2
The now-expired 1994 independent counsel statute had, like its three
predecessors, directed the Chief Justice of the United States to appoint threejudges from the Supreme Court and/or the federal Courts of Appeals to serve
on the special court for two-year terms.3 This independent counsel court, which
was located for administrative purposes in the United States Court ofAppeals for
* Associate Professor, St.John's University School of Law. A.B. Georgetown University,
1983,J.D. Harvard University, 1986. E-maih jbarrett@sjulawfac.stjohns.edu. Copyright 02000
by John Q. Barrett. I am grateful to Professor Erin Daly for assembling this symposium; to
Michael Simons, Jeff Sovem, Susan Stabile, Brian Tamanaha and Sarah Wazer for very helpful
comments on drafts of this article; to Marilyn Sargent, Chief Deputy Clerk, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who generously provided public record information
and thus helped to make the Table that accompanies this article as accurate as possible; and to
Karen R. Kowalski and Edward J. His for excellent research assistance. Although I served as
Associate Counsel in the Office of Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh from 1988 to 1993
and in the Department ofJustice during 1994-1995, this article reflects solely my own views.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 49(a) (1994). Although the independent counsel law expired on June 30,
1999, see 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994), independent counsel who were in office on that date and the
independent counsel law itself, including its provisions relating to the special division of the Court
ofAppeals, "continue in effect with respect to then pending matters before an independent counsel
... until that independent counsel determines such matters have been completed." Id
2. 28 U.S.C. § 49(a) (1994). Throughout this article, my descriptions of and all references
and citations to the independent counsel law refer to the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act
that President Clinton signed into law on June 30, 1994. Its predecessor versions, which were
enacted in 1978,1982 and 1987, each differed in various ways that do not affect my general argu-
ment. For a description of some of the amendments that changed the independent counsel laws
from one version to the next between 1978 and 1994, sep KatyJ. Harriger, The Hitoty oftIbelIden-
dent CounselPnvsi'ons HowthePasrtIlformsthe CurrntDebate, 49 MERCERL REV. 489,505-14 (1998).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 49(d) (1994). The law required the ChiefJustice to pick one of the three
judges from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and prohibited
him from picking more than one judge from any court. Id The law directed the ChiefJustice, as
he assigned judges to this special court, to give priority "to senior circuit judges and retired justices."
28 U.S.C. S 49(c) (1994). Although ChiefJustices Burger and Rehnquist assigned numerous Senior
CircuitJudges to this court, neither assigned a Supreme CourtJustice to serve.
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the District of Columbia Circuit,4 came to be known colloquially as the "Special
Division."5
Under the independent counsel law, these judges were assigned as a panel to
perform a range of responsibilities that were collateral to their regular work as
members of Article Ill courts. The law directed the Special Division to receive
notification from the Attorney General that she would not be requesting
appointment of independent counsel in particular matters whenever the
Department ofJustice had conducted a preliminary investigation and found "no
reasonable grounds to believe that frither investigation [was] warranted."6 The
statute also designated the Special Division to receive all Attorney General
requests to appoint independent counsel in specific matters7 and, in such
instances, it required the Special Division to appoint someone to serve as the
particular independent counsel.' The Special Division also was to receive and to
act upon any Attorney General's request to expand the jurisdiction of an existing
independent counsel 9 The statute also authorized the Special Division to receive
and act upon a direct request from any independent counsel to refer to him or
her a matter that related to his or her existing investigative jurisdiction." The
Special Division also would receive periodic budget information from
independent counsel" and determine, at prescribed intervals, whether each
independent counsel's workwas so substantially completed that he or she should
be discharged." The independent counsel law also directed the Special Division
to receive under seal the required finalreport of each independent counsel.13 The
law authorized the Special Division to distribute relevant portions of such a
report to the persons it named, to receive any comments they chose to submit
and to determine, in the end, whether the report and such comments should be
4. See 28 U.S.C. S 49(a) (1994) (directing the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, beginningwith the 1987 version of the statute, to "serve as the
clerk of such division" and to "provide such services as are needed by such division"); see alo Bruce
D. Brown, Help Wanted, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at 6 (noting D.C. Circuit Judge David B.
Sentelle's employment of a special assistant to handle the volume of work relating to his
responsibilities as the PresidingJudge of this court).
5. As Judge Gerhard A. Gesell once noted, the Special Division's official title is
"cumbersome[]." United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 387, 388 n.1 (D.D.C. 1988).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1994).
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(c)-(d) (1994).
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(b)(1)-(3) (1994).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(1) (1994).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1994).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(A) (1994).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994). These provisions, which had no counterparts in the
1978, 1982 or 1987 independent counsel statutes, have been upheld against constitutional
challenges. See, e.g., United States v. McDougal, 906 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Ark. 1995).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (1994).
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released publicly. 4 The statute also charged the Special Division with receiving
and adjudicatingrequests from subjects ofindependent counselinvestigations for
reimbursement of attorneys' fees and other costs that they would not have
incurred "but for" the existence of the independent counsel statute.
15
Since its inception, the independent counsel law has embodied the idea of
directing a special court to play these roles as part of the general reaction to
Watergate. In essence, Congress and President Carter, who signed the first
independent counsel act into law, created the Special Division following
Watergate to play three general but vital roles that previously had been performed
by Executive Branch officials and institutions. One role for the judges of the
Special Division to play would be to appoint, in the next case where there was
good reason to conduct a criminal investigation of a president or his close
associates, an excellent, experienced, independent attorney who would have all
the power and jurisdiction necessary to conduct the investigation. In this respect,
the Special Division would replace the serendipity that had led Attorney General-
designate Elliot Richardson to pledge to the Senate--as the condition that
obtained its confirmation of him to the Attorney General office that President
Nixon politically needed Richardson to attain in May 1973-that he would
appoint and broadly empower Archibald Cox to investigate Watergate-related
matters and persons including the President himself.
The second role for the judges of the Special Division would be to protect an
independent counsel from the retaliatory powers of a president or any Executive
Branch official who would be bound to follow the president's orders. In this
respect, the Special Division would replace the extraordinary explosion of
negative public reaction that followed President Nixon's firing of Cox, which led
to the reinstatement of his Watergate Special Prosecution Force staff and the
President's appointment ofa fully empowered successor specialprosecutor, Leon
Jaworski.
The third role for the judges of the Special Division would be to see an
independent counsel through his or her work administratively, to the point of
releasing publicly the counsel's final, comprehensive report. In this respect, the
Special Division would replace the ad hoe processes that had marked the
conclusion of the Watergate investigations and trials.
These were the romantic, post-Watergate ideas behind the Special Division
mechanism of the independent counsel statute. Sadly, after twenty years of
experience, we now know that the Special Division structure has not fulfilled
these hopes. The Special Division has been able to perform much of its first
role. It has, in more than twenty separate matters since 1978, generally succeeded
in appointing independent counsel who had much of the power and
independence they needed to conduct their respective investigations. (The
quality of some of the Special Division's independent counsel appointees is a
14. See 28 U.S.C. S 594(h)(2) (1994).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(o (1994).
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separate and obviously a much debated topic.) The Special Division's ability to
protect independent counsel proved to be much less dear. Indeed, while there
are only a few known instances where the Special Division even tried to facilitate,
much less where it succeeded in facilitating, an independent counsel's work, there
were instances where the Special Division, or at least some of its members,
seemed to be at odds with, and even critical of, "its"- independent counsel.
Indeed, in both the Iran/Contra and Whitewater matters, the tension that was
apparent on occasion between one or more judges of the Special Division and
the independent counsel it had appointed became the publicly visible substance
of how the Special Division handled administrative issues relating to those
investigations.
These Special Division performance problems are not, however, the sum of
our experience. In addition to the Special Division's very mixed record in
fulfilling its hoped-for statutory roles, the Special Division concept backfired as
the judges themselves became, over time, fairly or unfairly, subjects of
controversy. The Special Division itself thus contributed, by its actions or simply
as it became a focus of debate, to the criticism that came to surround the
independent counsel law in the abstract and almost every independent counsel
(of course some independent counsel more than others!) in his or her work. The
Special Division mechanism came to hurt the public impression of the
independence and fairness of independent counsel. This diminished public
confidence in the vigor, independence and fairness of independent counsel
investigations of high government officials, which was the raison d'eft for vesting
the power to appoint independent counsel in a court of law rather than in the
Executive Branch. In addition, the Special Division component of the
independent counsel law also contributed to negative and harmful perceptions
about the independence and abilities of federal judges generally because the
personnel of the Special Division were, in their "day jobs," federal judges serving
on Article III courts.
This article traces some of the history of the Special Division and the turns in
the road that brought us to this lamentable point. I argue that, with regard to this
particular piece of the independent counsel law, twenty years of experience
suggest thatwe should not mourn the passing of the Special Division as we knew
it. For the future, in writing any statute that again vests in a court of law the
power to appoint someone with the power and independence to investigate a
president or any of his intimates, the challenge will be to structure a more limited,
mechanical and thus realistic--and likely a less controversy-generating- role for
any federal judge who is called to perform this collateral duty.
[Vol. 5:17
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II. THE ARC OF THE SPECIAL DIVISION
A Romance
The independent counsel statute originated, of course, in the "Saturday Night
Massacre" of October 20,1973. The attempted "massacre" illustrated to millions
of outraged Americans that commencing and conducting criminal investigations
of the highest officials of the Executive Branch can fail if they retain supervisory
power over the inquiry. Indeed, an investigation of the President of the United
States is particularly likely to fail because, as a constitutional matter, he always will
retain ultimate supervisory power over the investigation.
In that maelstrom of late 1973, as President Nixon "massacred" Watergate
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and the Attorney General who had appointed
him, and as Nixon attempted, ultimately without success, to shut down Cox's
investigative staff, one branch of government was the shining beacon: the federal
judiciary. Although the heroes of 1973 included Attorney General Elliot
Richardson, Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, Special Prosecutor
Cox and the Watergate prosecutors, the figure of law-and-order who actually
remained standing and was much admired during that crisis was ChiefJudgeJohn
J. Sirica of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It was
Judge Sirica who had issued the order directing President Nixon to comply with
the grand jury subpoena for specified White House tapes and thus precipitated
Nixon's firing of Cox. 6 In addition to Chief Judge Sirica, it was the en bane
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that had
affirmed Judge Sirica's order,'7 leading directly to the "massacre."" Soon after
the "massacre," when the White House tapes were produced and White House
counsel revealed to the court and, through it, to the grand jury that some tapes
were missing and others had been mysteriously damaged, it was Chief Judge
Sirica who ordered the inquiry that ultimately determined that tapes had been
altered deliberately.19
In response to the "massacre," Congress began within weeks to consider a raft
of legislative proposals that tried to replace what had proven vulnerable to
President Nixon with what had been widely admired in ChiefJudge Sirica and his
judicial brethren: their power, their independence, and their specific ability to
empower an aggressive, concededly appropriate criminal investigation of a sitting
President.2 After five years of legislative debate over various proposals, an
16. Set In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973) (Sirica, C.J.).
17. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (tfecruriar).
18. SeegteneralBOBWOODWARD&CARLBERNsTEiN,THEFINALDAYs 62-72 (1976); KEN
GORMLEY, ARcHIBALD Cox CONSCMENCEOFANATION 309,313-14 (1997).
19. See general David Beckwith,JmdgeJoh#J. Siria= Standig Firm far tie Primag of Law, TIME,
Jan. 7,1974, at 12 (cover story in issue namingJudge Sirica TimeMagarnIs "Man of the Year").
20. One example is the "Independent Special Prosecutor Act of 1973," which was a Senate
2000]
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Ethics in Government Act became law in 1978. This new statute created a
Special Division that was to be the institutionalized equivalent of what Chief
Judge Sirica had been in 1973 and 1974. The statute directed the ChiefJustice
of the United States to appoint three senior federal judges who would, in any
future case where an Attorney General determined that the possibility of criminal
conduct by a senior official needed investigation, find the right independent
counsel to do the job, give him or her the necessary jurisdiction and authority,
and, as the investigation went forward, protect that counsel's independence and
power.
B. Accomplishments
Beginning in 1978, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger discharged his statutory
responsibility under the independent counsel law by appointing the first three
Circuit Judges to serve as the Special Division.21 The Table that follows this
article lists the distinguished judges who have, by Chief Justice appointment,
served on the Special Division, their respective terms of service, and the
independent counsel matters that occurred during those terms.'
The first PresidingJudge of the Special Division, Senior CircuitJudge Roger
Robb of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
served in this capacity from 1978 through 1985' Although the Special Division
appointed four independent counsel to conduct various investigations of senior
officials during this period, no counsel sought to prosecute any subject of his
proposal to vest the power to appoint a special prosecutor for the Watergate Grand Jury
investigation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, exercised through a
three-judge panel, no member of which could sit on matters involving the special prosecutor. S.
REP. No. 93-59 (1973). See also The Spedal ProsecutorAct of 1976, H.R. 14476, 94th Cong. (1976)
(providing for D.C. Circuit review of Attorney General decisions to self-disqualify and to appoint
a "Temporary Special Prosecutor" within a new Department ofJustice Division of Government
Crimes, and for direct Court appointment of Temporary Special Prosecutors); TheSpiedalProsecutor
Actof1977, H.R. 2835,95th Cong. (1977) (providing for D.C. Circuit appointment and removal
of a "Temporary Special Prosecutor"); The Pubic O 7dals Intgdy Act of 1977, S. 555, 95th Cong.
(1977) (providing for D.C. Circuit appointment and Attorney General removal of a 'Temporary
Special Prosecutor"); see general Thomas W. Merrill, Byond the Independent Counsek Evaluating the
Options, 43 ST. Louis U. UJ. 1047, 1048 (1999); Ken Gormley, An Ot~nalModelof the Independent
CounselStatute, 97 MIcH. L. REV. 601,678-84 (1998).
21. See Table I, "The Judges of the Special Division and their Independent Counsel
Appointees, 1978-1999," infra pages 44-47.
22. See Table I, infra pages 44-47.
23. See Judge Roger Robb of U.S. Appeals Court Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1985, at 21 (noting
Judge Robb's service on the Special Division from 1978 until his death).
24. SeeTable I, infra page 44. These early appointees, and also many of the later independent
counsel, generallywere experienced former prosecutors, former senior government officials, persons
without perceived ideological commitments, and/or attorneys in private practice without ambitions
[Vol 5:17
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investigation. Given this absence of criminal cases, it is not surprising that the
earliest days of the Special Division were relatively quiet and, for the most part,
non-controversial.' The Special Division did, however, facilitate the Bronx, New
York prosecution of one Cabinet officer, Secretary of Labor Raymond J.
Donovan. During this period, the Special Division authorized deliveries to the
Bronx District Attorney of federal grand jury information that had been
generated by the work of Independent Counsel Leon Silverman. These court
actions occurred under seal and were not disclosed at the time.26
C. Complications
The second PresidingJudge of the Special Division, Senior Judge George E.
MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit, served for a similar, but ultimately a much more
tumultuous, period (1985-1992).27 In early 1986, the Special Division received,
for the first time, virtually simultaneous Attorney General requests to appoint
independent counsel. The requests pertained to two matters that, although
separate, were highlyvisible, politically-charged and involved former top officials
of the Reagan Administration. A massive committee report that House
Democrats sent to Attorney General Meese triggered one request, which resulted
in the court's appointment of Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison to
investigate former Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson.s The other
for further careers in appointed or elected office. SeegeneralJohn Q. Barrett, Indoendent Counsel
Law Iiroveenisfor the Next Five Years, 51 ADMIN. L REV. 631, 646, 647 (1999).
25. See general George Lardner Jr., Secret Court Guides High-Leve! Inquides; Panel Oversees Key
Papers in Donovan Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1986, at A19 (describing the Special Division as "a
little-known Washington institution set up eight years ago"). One Special Division matter that did
attract some attention during this period was its unsealing and adjudication of Edwin Meese's
request for reimbursement of attorneys' fees he had incurred as the subject of the 1984 investigation
by Independent Counsel Jacob Stein. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Court End Seare on Meese's Requestfor
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1985, at A17.
26. It was later reported that Bronx prosecutors had, in 1982 and 1984, sought and obtained
from the Special Division "copies of federal grand jury testimony and other sealed evidence
compiled by special prosecutor Leon Silverman in his 1982 investigation of alleged ties between
Donovan and members of organized crime." Lardner, spra note 25. After a Bronx grand jury
indicted Donovan in 1984, his attorneys asked the Special Division to "retrieve" the Silverman
grand jury records, but it declined to do so. Id Donovan ultimately was acquitted on all counts
after a lengthy trial. See Selwyn Raab, Donovan Ckared ofFramud Chaes ByJum in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1987, at Al.
27. See NINA TOTENBERG, JUDGE GEORGE MAcKINNON Is REMEMBERED IN
WASHINGTON, D.C. (Nat'l Pub. Radio, May 5, 1995) (available in LEXIS) (describing and
broadcasting excerpts from a final interview withJudge MacKinnon, shortly before his death, about
"the appointment he was most proud of, the appointment of Lawrence Walsh as Iran/Contra
special prosecutor").
28. For background information regarding this independent counsel appointment, see In ir
2000]
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request triggered the Special Division's appointment of Independent Counsel
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. to investigate former senior White House adviser
Michael K Deaver.
As these momentous investigations moved forward, one to a constitutional
confrontation over the independent counsel law itself and the other to its first
criminal trial and conviction, the Special Division was seen for the first time as
a participant in matters that were not topics of national consensus, unlike the
judicial decisions of Watergate. The Special Division, for example, tacked back
and forth, showing its indecision and misgivings in public, before it reaffirmed
its earlier decision to permit the Bronx District Attorney to use federal grand
jury information in the state court trial of Raymond Donovan.' The Special
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476,478-80 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,665-67
(1988).
29. See xipra note 26.
30. A press report after-the-fact described the odd proceedings about this matter that began
in February 1986:
In a routine motion ... Bronx prosecutors asked the special court to
"authenticate" the [federal grand jury] documents so they could be admitted
into evidence at [Donovan's] trial....
The panel, now headed by [Senior CircuitJudge MacKinnon], treated the
motion as if it were a request for a fresh disclosure. In a three-page ruling
underlined "Confidential," it gave prosecutors [thirty days] to answer more
than 350 questions. Why is each of the 70 items needed to avoid "a
miscarriage ofjustice"? How does the need for disclosure of each exceed "the
need for continuous secrecy"? Just how is each item to be used at trial? As
substantive evidence? To impeach a witness? Refresh a recollection? Test
credibility?
All this and more was concluded with a sternly worded "no disclosure"
edict....
Lardner, spra note 25. In May 1986, the Special Division heard oral arguments on this matter in
a session that was closed to the public. See George LardnerJr., Sp edal Court ConsidersDonovan Trial
Evidence; Ethics Act Materials My Be Withheld, WASH. POST, June 1, 1986, at A19. Two media
litigants, the Washington Post and the New York Dai News, then intervened in this matter and sought
access to the Special Division's records. See George Lardner, Jr., Post, N.Y. Da/i News Seek Liftiig
of Blackout in Donovan Dispute; Secreq Involhes Proceed'ings on the Evidence, WASH. POST, June 18,1986,
at A6. The Special Division denied this motion and, in an extraordinary development, it also
summarily ordered the newspaper litigants not to report on its denial of their motion. See George
Lardner, Jr. & Eleanor Randolph, Gag Order on 2 Newspapers in Donovan Case Is Lifted, WASH. POST,
July 4,1986, at Al. Within days, but only after the newspaper had appealed to the Supreme Court,
the Special Division lifted its "gag on the gag" order. See In re Donovan, 801 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir.
Spec. Div. 1986) (per wriam). A month later, the Special Division authorized the Bronx District
Attorney to use at Donovan's trial all of the federal grand jury information that the Special Division
originally had provided to the DistrictAttorney. SeeGeorge Lardner,Jr.,SpedalCourtAuthoties Use
of Donovan Evidence; Records Calkd Cuiticalto N.Y. Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,1986, at A6. As
the Washington Post reported with a certain smugness, this final ruling "represent[ed] a complete
[V/ol. 5:17
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Division also, in late 1986, granted Independent Counsel Seymour's request to
expand his investigative jurisdiction to persons other than Michael Deaver.31 By
the end of 1986, Attorney General Meese's request also compelled the Special
Division to appoint an independent counsel in what Judge MacKinnon
recognized at the time as "the most important case" that had been referred to the
Special Division in its eight year existence: the Iran/Contra investigation.32
D. Suipidons
The role of the Special Division became controversial, and the ill-advised
nature of the statute assigning selected responsibilities to federal judges became
even dearer, during the late 1980's.
During 1987-1988, the Special Division survived what was in part a judicial
referendum on its early years of operation. OnJanuary 22,1988, a divided panel
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declared the
independent counsel statute unconstitutional.33 Among the many constitutional
infirnities that the panel majority perceived in the statute was its allocation of
non-Article Ill powers to an Article III court' The majority described a
member of the SpecialDivision conferring expartewith an independent counsel.3"
The court also listed instances where the Special Division had issued orders
affecting an independent counsel's conduct of a federal criminal investigation,
outside the context of a case or controversy and without providing notice to
interested parties or holding a hearing. 6 The SpecialDivision had become, as the
Circuit Court understoodits history, the supervisor of each independent counsel,
unconstitutionally exercising power that the Constitution allocated to a unitary
Executive.37
The Supreme Court, of course, disagreed fundamentally with this view. On
June 29,1988, in Monison v. 01son, the Court, by a decisive 7-1 margin, upheld the
constitutionality of the independent counsel law.38 With respect to the Special
turnabout from initial orders and tentative observations by the three-judge panel at proceedings
over the [preceding] four months." Id The Special Division divided 2-1 in reaching this judgment,
which marked the first time that it displayed any panel division to the public. See id (describing
Judge Mansfield's dissenting opinion).
31. See Howard Kurtz, Spedal Counsel Expands Prbe BVeond Deaver, WASH. PoST, Dec. 17,
1986, at Al.
32. See Philip Shenon, Canddatesfor Proseculor Rported, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1986, at A15
(reporting an interview with Judge MacKinnon).
33. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
34. Seeid at 511-17.
35. See id at 514.
36. See id
37. See, e.g., id at 502 ('In truth, ... the Special Court has more of a supervisory role over the
independent counsel than does the Attorney General..
38. See Monion, 487 U.S. 654.
2000]
Widener Law Symposium Journal
Division, the Court majority brushed past the track record issues that had been
raised by the appellate court The Court found them troubling, true, 9 but it noted
that these instances of Special Division conduct were not "before [the Court] as
such."'  Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist-who of course had appointed the
incumbentJudges of the Special Division- authored the majority opinion that
read the statute as allocating to them only narrow, somewhat passive, or largely
administrative, and thus constitutionallyunproblematic, duties,!' Looking to the
future conduct of Special Division judges, however, the Chief Justice concluded
his analysis with a caution to them that was less than subtle:
The propriety of the Special Division's actions in these instances is not before us
as such, but we nonetheless think it appropriate to point out not only that there
is no authorization for such actions in the Act itself, but that the Division's
exercise of unauthorized powers risks the transgression of the constitutional
limitations of Article III that we have just discussed.4
These rhetorical patches, however, did not hold for long. A major fault line
opened during the first Iran/Contra criminal trial, which occurred a little more
than a year after the Morrison decision. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L.
North, by then a hero to many people for his public performance as an
immunized witness before the Congressional Iran/Contra Select Committees in
1987, was being prosecuted the next year by Independent Counsel Lawrence E.
Walsh. The first occasion for controversy, although it was a small tear that may
have been noticed at the time only by the litigants who received it, was a sua sponte
Order issued by the Special Division.43 The three judges acted, at their own
initiative, to help Walsh defeat one of North's many pretrial motions to dismiss
the criminal charges against him." Mondson notwithstanding, the Special Division
was back-unrequested-taking the side of an independent counsel in highly
adversarial proceedings.45
39. Seegenraly it at 684-85 & n.22.
40. Id. at 684.
41. See id at 681.
42. Id at 684-85.
43. See Order Supplementing Record, In re North, Div. No. 86-6 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Oct.
24, 1988) (per mriam) (unpublished Order on file with author).
44. The Special Division explained that it had taken "judicial notice" of motions, filed by
North in the District Court, that challenged the legality of the charges against him that related to
the Nicaraguan Contras. Id at 1 & n.1. North's motions had argued, among other things, that
because Attorney General Meese's request to the Special Division for an independent counsel
appointment did not specify support for the Contras that originated outside of arms sales to Iran,
the Special Division's conferral of such jurisdiction to Independent Counsel Walsh was illegal. As
part of refuting this claim by North, the Special Division attached a Meese press statement to its
Order. See id
45. Judge Gesell, to whom the North case had been specially assigned, did not rely on the
Special Division's belated "Order Supplementing Record" when he denied North's motion. North,
[Vol. 5:17
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Another Special Division "system" actor-Chief Justice Rehnquist
himself-took individual action in the North case that attracted notice and
criticism. In February 1989, on the eve of North's trial, the ChiefJustice granted
a stay motion by the United States Department of Justice, a non-party
intervenor.' The Department had moved-without success in the trial court and
the court of appeals, and then in the Supreme Court-to stay North's criminal
trial because of professed concerns about the trial court's classified information
procedures. There is no factual basis to believe that the ChiefJustice was doing
anything other than properly performing his "day job" as a member of the Court
when he adjudicated and granted the Department's emergency motion. His
judicial action nonetheless put him into the arena of independent counsel
prosecuting, in the context of the most white hot independent counsel case to
that date and on the side of a non-party advocate (the Department of Justice)
that, at that moment, wanted the Independent Counsel not to commence the
trial. In this context, not surprisingly, the ChiefJustice's stay order created some
public confusion and even suspicion that he was a partisan on the merits of the
Independent Counsel's criminal prosecution of Oliver North.
More, and obviously related, suspicions about the impartiality of federal judges
arose following the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit's summer 1990 decision to vacate North's convictions.47 The Court of
Appeals split along so called "political" lines both at the panel level and, to a
less visible degree, when it decided Walsh's petition for panel rehearing49 and
708 F. Supp. at 387 (denying North's motion, among others, and not mentioning the Special
Division's order).
46. SeeThomburgh v. Walsh, No. A-643,1989 U.S. LEXIS 591 (Feb. 12,1989) (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (staying the North trial pending the full Court's consideration of the Attorney General's
motion for stay pending appeal), vacated, 57 U.S.L.W. 3545,1989 U.S. LEXIS 593 (Feb. 16, 1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J.).
47. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(W cadam), amended, 920 F.2d
940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(peramadi), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
48. Circuit Judges David B. Sentelle and Laurence H. Silberman, who each had been
nominated to the court by President Reagan, voted to vacate North's convictions and filed an
opinion per cmin. See Nodh, 910 F.2d at 851-913. ChiefJudge Patricia Wald, one of President
Carter's nominees, dissented from the panel judgment and filed an opinion dissenting from most
of the majority opinion. See ia at 913-32 (Wald, C.J., dissenting as to Parts I, II, and III(B)(2)).
Judge Silberman also filed an opinion expressing disagreement with distinct aspects of the majority
opinion that rejected some of North's claims of reversible error. See id at 932-60 (Silberman,J.,
concurring dubitante as to Part IV, and dissenting as to Parts III(B)(1), IV, V, and VII).
49. On Walsh's petition for panel rehearing, the court unanimously withdrew a factually
inaccurate section of the original majority opinion. See United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (per eriam). Judges Sentelle and Silberman also filed a separate opinion,piert riam,
explaining their decision to grant the petition in part, deny it in part and modify the original majority
opinion accordingly. See id at 941-51 (ertwria). Judge Wald filed a new opinion dissenting from
these judgments. See id at 951-59 (WaldJ., dissenting as to Parts 1, 11, & III).
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considered his suggestion for rehearing en banes This pattern, which cannot be
demonstrated to mean anything at al5 unfortunately gave partisans on all sides
of specific Iran/Contra and/or general independent counsel law issues a basis
to believe that the judging in independent counsel cases in District of Columbia
federal courts, the seat of the Special Division itself, might be as political as it
would have been simply to leave criminal law decision making regarding senior
executive branch officials in the Department of Justice and subject to the threat
of Presidential influence.
The appearances and suspicions got worse. One of the Judges who had
participated in deciding the North appeal was D.C. Circuit Judge David B.
Sentelle. In July 1990, Judge Sentelle voted with the bare majorities that vacated
North's convictions and to deny Walsh's petition for rehearing. s2 A year or so
later, in November 1991,Judge Sentelle was half of a second panel decision that
decided, again by a bare majority, to undo the criminal convictions of Vice
AdmiralJohn M. Poindexter that the office ofIran/Contra Independent Counsel
Walsh had obtained. 3 As in the North case, the Poindexterpanel regrettably split
along "political" lines.54 And no sooner were the North and Poindexter cases
50. See id. at 959 (per tuiam) (denying suggestion for rehearing en bam). At the time of this
decision (November 27,1990), therewere twelve judges in active service on the Court ofAppeals.
President Carter had nominated four, President Reagan had nominated five, and PresidentBush had
nominated three of the judges. Of the four Carter nominees, two (Judge AbnerJ. Mikva andJudge
Harry T. Edwards) did not participate in deciding the matter, one (ChiefJudge Wald) voted to grant
the suggestion for rehearing en bancwithout limitation; and one (udge Ruth Bader Ginsburg) voted
to grant the suggestion with respect to one issue only. See iM Of the eight Reagan or Bush
nominees (Judges Silberman,James L. Buddey, Stephen F. Williams, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Sentelle,
Clarence Thomas, Karen LeCraft Henderson and A. Raymond Randolph), there is no record that
any of the judges voted to grant the suggestion. Pursuant to the court's rules, Walsh's suggestion
for rehearing en banwas denied because a majority (i.e., seven) of the Judges did not vote in favor
of the suggestion. Id.
51. JudgePatriciaWald explainedinarecentinterviewhowitis unfairin fact and detrimental
to the judiciary's reputation for independence "to tag judges based on the party of the president that
appointed them." VaIdLooks Back as She Preares to Move On, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 20,1999, at 9;
see also The Futre ofthe lndpendent CounrelAct Hearngs Befare the Senate Comm. on GomrmentalAffairs,
106th Cong. 500 (1999) (testimony ofJudge Peter Fay):
Labels are very dangerous. I was appointed by two Republican Presidents, one
to the District Court, one to the Court of Appeals. I had more Democratic
support than I ever had Republican support.... I have been a federal judge
now for 29 years. I can assure, you I have no politics. I mean, I am about as
apolitical, I guess, as a creature could become. And the longer you're a judge,
you are just totally removed from it.
Iad
52. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
53. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cit. 1991), ert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021
(1992).
54. Circuit Judges Douglas Ginsburg and Sentelle, who each had been nominated to the
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beyond the D.C. Circuit than-indeed, the Poindexter case was literally pending
in the Supreme Court on Walsh's petition for a writ of certiorariin October 1992
when-ChiefJustice Relnquist, for no explained or apparent reason, designated
Judge Sentelle to replace Judge MacKinnon as the PresidingJudge of the Special
Division."5 Although it may simply be the case that Judge MacKinnon declined
reapp ointment to this position, triggering the statutory requirement that the Chief
Justice appoint a successor judge from the D.C. Circuit,56 MacKinnon privately
described his replacement as involuntary. 7 Commentators began to suspect that
Judge Sentelle had passed some kind of an audition by his decisions in the North
and Poindextr cases." Judge Sentele thus was suspect to some observers even
as he assumed the role of Presiding Judge of the Special Division, and this
court by President Reagan, voted to reverse Poindexter's convictions. See Poinexter, 951 F.2d at
369. Judge Ginsburg wrote the opinion explaining their judgment. See id at 371-88. ChiefJudge
Mikva, who was one of President Carter's nominees, dissented from the majority's judgment and
filed a dissenting opinion. See id at 388-92
55. See Designation of a United States Judge to the Division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the Appointment of Independent Counsel (Nov.
5, 1992) (signed order of Chief Justice Rehnquist designating "Honorable David B. Sentelle" to
serve "for the life of the savings clause contained in 28 U.S.C. S 599, but not exceeding the statutory
two-year term provided by 28 U.S.C. § 49(a), which will expire on October 26,1994") (copy on file
with author). This Designation, which appears to be a modified form document that could be used
to designate any D.C. CircuitJudge to the Special Division, noted that it followed a "Letter dated
10/26/92." Id The Supreme Court denied Walsh's petition for a writ of a, rioraidin the Poindexter
case six weeks later. See 506 U.S. 1021.
56. Two years later, and shortly after the Special Division had made its controversial
appointment of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, a short press item on this topic appeared
in the weekly legal newspaper of Washington, D.C. The item explained that, notwithstanding the
statutory preference for a senior circuit judge, Chief Justice Rehnquist had to appoint an active
circuit judge to preside over the Special Division in October 1992 because, afterJudge MacKinnon
stepped down, there was no other senior appellate judge in the Circuit. See Inadmirsbk, Sentdek's
Situation, LEGALTIMES, Aug. 15,1994, at 3.
57. SeeLARENCEE.WAISH,FIREWAiLUTHEIRAN-CONTRACONSPIRACYANDCOVER-UP
477 (1997) (describing his November 16,1992, conversation with Judge MacKinnon).
58. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, FautliesNot On# In StarrBat In Law, NAr'LLJ., Apr. 20,
1998, at A19.
When Judge Sentelle was appointed to the Special Division in 1992, he was
not yet 50 years old and had been sitting on the court of appeals only since
1987. Mr. Clinton had just defeated President Bush in the election, and
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh was prosecuting members of the
Reagan administration, which had, only a few years earlier, appointed Mr.
Sentelle first to the district court and then to the court of appeals.
Id See also Richard Harwood, Crudiies, Ironies & Black Huror, WASH. POST, Aug. 13,1994, at A17
(claiming, in a column criticizing the Special Division's August 1994 appointment of Kenneth W.
Starr to be independent counsel, that "Sentelle wrote the majority opinion overturning the
conviction for Iran-contra crimes of Oliver North").
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perception only compounded the preexisting suspicions regarding the Chief
Justice himself.9
Other odd developments called the Special Division's loyalties and capabilities
into question during the final days of Iran/Contra. In 1992, for instance, the
Special Division broke with its eight-year tradition of not accepting sealed
pleadings from subjects of independent counsel investigations who were,
pursuant to a provision in the statute,' seeking reimbursement for their
attorneys' fees.61 It accepted, exparte and under seal, a fee reimbursement
petition from at least one of Walsh's subjects.62 The Special Division also began,
even before it had received the comments of persons named in Walsh's Final
Report or decided whether to release it publicly, to render decisions in late 1993
that awarded such fees. 3 Given the Special Division's relative unfamiliarity with
Walsh's investigations and the length and factual complexity of the Final Report
that he had submitted under seal for the Special Division's review and handling,
it was perhaps understandable that some of the court's opinions explaining these
early fee awards were riddled with errors." What was harder to comprehend as
59. See suara note 56; see aro Solan, s.upra note 58, at A19 (arguing that, because it created an
"appearance of conflicting loyalties,' it was "inconsistent with the spirit of the [independent
counsel] statute for Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to appoint Judge Sentelle to the Special
Division in the first place and then to reappoint him and the two other members again and again").
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(0 (1987). The first of the independent counsel statutes to contain this
attorney fee reimbursement provision was the 1987 statute. See Pub. L. 100-191.
61. See Taylor, supra note 25, at A17 (reporting the Special Division's decision to unseal the
pleadings relating to Edwin Meese's 1984 request for attorney fee reimbursement).
62. Counsel for former Secretary of State George P. Shultz filed, under seal, their petition
seeking fee reimbursement shortly before the 1987 independent counsel law expired on December
15, 1992, but neither they nor the Special Division notified Walsh or served him with a copy.
Walsh's office later learned of the filing from the Department of'Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(0(1)-
(2) (1987) (directing the Special Division to notify the Attorney General ofany request for attorneys'
fees and authorizing it to request her written evaluation of any request). Walsh then asked Shultz's
attorneys for a copy of their filing, which they, after some reflection, agreed to provide in early 1993.
In August 1993, Walsh submitted his Final Report, which described the Shultz investigation in
detail, to the Special Division. On December 7,1993, it granted Shultz's petition. See In reNorth
(Shultz Fee Application), 8 F.3d 847 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1993) (per curiam).
63. See, e.g., In re North (Dutton Fee Application), 11 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1993)
(per cutmam) (decided November 30, 1993) (awarding $39,946.14); In re North (Shultz Fee
Application), 8 F.3d at 847 (decided December 7, 1993) (awarding $281,397.69). In the first of
these cases, the Special Division did describe itself as "having in hand all that we deem necessary
to make an educated determination. .. ." In re North (Dutton), 11 F.3d at 1077.
64. In the Shul case, for instance, the Special Division based its decision that Shultz incurred
attorneys' fees that he would not have incurred "but for" the independent counsel law, which is the
statutory predicate to be eligible for fee reimbursement, on a series of flat statements. The Special
Division opined: (1) "an appointed Attorney General would normally not have treated [actions
allegedly constituting a conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendments] as having criminal
consequences,' 8 F.3d at 851; (2) that "much of [Walsh's] investigation [of Shultz] involved
[Vol. 5:17
Spedal Division Agonistes
judicial behavior was the Special Division's flat refusal to reconsider, much less
to correct, its inaccurate opinions even after Walsh responded to some fee award
decisions by asking the court to reconsider and pointing it to the relevant factual
information it seemed to have missed.6" The Special Division also began, in this
period, to write with obvious sarcasm and derision as it described Walsh's work."
To the attentive audience, the message of these actions was unmistakable: the
Special Division had switched sides. Although the Attorney General had not
sought to terminate Walsh's appointment for cause and the Special Division had
not exercised its statutory power to terminate his work, the (new) Special
Division had joined the opponents and critics of the (old) Special Division's
Independent Counsel.
circumvention of the Boland Amendments.. .," id; and (3) that Attorney General Meese had
conducted a preliminary investigation prior to Walsh's 1986 appointment of "events involving
[Shultz's] conduce' and did not recommend his criminal investigation, which meant that "it [wa]s
not reasonable to expect that a professional prosecutor, as opposed to an independent counsel
under the Act, would have been making subjects out of persons theretofore treated as witnesses
four and one-half years after the commencement of an investigation, absent some circumstances
far more extraordinary than any displayed to us here." Id.
The Special Division was, in fact, triply wrong. Without belaboring the details: (1) the
Department of Justice was in the midst of conducting a number of criminal investigations of so-
called "Boland Amendment violations" and related Neutrality Act violations when Walsh was
appointed, and it even attempted formally to refer these to Walsh for his evaluation because they
fell within his jurisdiction; (2) none of these Walsh investigations, which were concluded by 1988,
focused on Shultz; and (3) the brief Department of Justice investigation that led to Meese's
December 1, 1986, request for an independent counsel (ie., Walsh) obviously had nothing to do
with Shulta's inaccurate testimony and statements to Congress and others, which first occurred later
that month and continued over the next two years, regarding his knowledge of arms shipments to
Iran, nor did they concern his connection to his aides' subsequent failures to produce relevant notes
that were requested and refuted Shultz's testimony. For the facts on all of this, sree LAWRENCE E.
WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATrERS 550-51
(Aug. 4,1993) (describing activities of the United States Attorney's Office in Miami in spring 1986
that included investigating "unauthorized use of Government funds" to support the Nicaraguan
Contras); id at 325-73 ("Chapter 24: The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill
and Plate). I raise the Shultz investigation here, which I did work on, very reluctantly. My point
is not to highlight Secretary Shultz's specific conduct as an Iran/Contra witness, which was not
criminal; nor to overlook his very long and distinguished careers in public service, private business
and academia; nor to begrudge his attorneys (who represented him admirably and effectively) their
fee award. My point is to highlight the Special Division's apparently deliberate disregard for facts
in its resolution of this matter.
65. In the Sht matter, the Special Division denied, without issuing an opinion, Walsh's
motion seeking reconsideration of the fee award.
66. See, e.g., In re North (Shultz Fee Application), 8 F.3d at 849 ('We will not rehash in detail
the much storied Walsh investigation.'); c. In Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.3d 652,
654 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1999) (CudahyJ., dissenting) (noting"theaggressive performance of this
Division in In ir North (Walsh Show Cause Order), 10 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1993)').
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This "Special Divisionversus Independent Counsel" dynamic continued in the
final phases of Walsh's work. In late 1993, after Walsh had filed his required
Final Report under sealin the Special Division and it had, pursuant to the statute,
distributed portions of the report to persons who were named therein, the
Special Division accepted exparte, sealed motions to suppress the Report's
publication.67 The Special Division also seemed to entertain briefly, but
ultimately denied, a motion to terminate Walsh's appointment while litigation
about the possible release of his Final Report was raging under seal.' In a final
shot at "its" Independent Counsel, the Special Division, in an opinion thatJudge
Sentelle conspicuously issued in his name,69 made a series of inaccurate
statements that seemed designed to suggest that Walsh had flouted the rules of
grand jury secrecy.70 The Special Division also, after it had released Walsh's
67. See In ir North (Omnibus Order), 16 F.3d 1234, 1235 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1994) (per
curiam) (referring to multiple "motions" to this effect but not identifying the movants); see also In tr
North (Emergency Motion of Soc'y ofPro'lJournalists, et al.), 21 F.3d 434,434-35 (D.C. Cir. Spec.
Div. 1994) (per uriam) (identifying former President Reagan as having filed such a motion).
68. See In re North (Walsh Show Cause Order), 10 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1993) (per
auiam). This litigation began when counsel to former President Reagan, who had received the full
text of Walsh's Final Report from the Special Division under seal for purposes of providing their
comments, suggested to the Special Division that it terminate Walsh's appointment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 594(h)(2). See id at 832. In response, the Special Division directed Walsh to show cause
why the Special Division should not order his office terminated except for performance of
ministerial functions that would be involved in preparing appendices to the Final Report. See ia
After receiving a response from Walsh that indicated his general agreement with both the Special
Division and the Reagan attorneys, the court entered an order that confirmed the limited nature of
Walsh's remaining duties. Id The Special Division also stated, however, "in what is probably an
excess of caution, [that] we wish to make it plain by this opinion that we do not contemplate the
scope [of Walsh's remaining duties] as being inclusive of... authority" to respond to comments
of persons named in the Final Report by making revisions or additions to the Report he had filed
in August 1993. Id at 834. Judge Butzner dissented from this aspect of his colleagues' opinion,
which he described as a "prior restraint" not authorized by the independent counsel statute. Id at
835 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. See ln reNorth (Omnibus Order), 16 F.3d at 1235 ('Opinion for the Special Division filed
by CircuitJudge Sentelle"). By contrast, the court issued most Special Division opinionspfermiam.
70. Judge Sentelle stated flatly, for instance, that Walsh had contended "that Rule 6(e) does
not apply to Independent Counsels at all." Id at 1242. This statement was a false description of
Walsh's sealed submission to the Court Judge Sentelle also wrote that the grand jury information
in Walsh's Final Report was like "leaven in a loaf of bread" and could not be redacted. Id at 1242.
This too was false. See WALSH, Lupra note 64 (footnoting, throughout the Report, each piece of
grand jury information to the particular grand jury transcript from which it was quoted or derived,
making it possible to redact the information with ease). Judge Sentelle also claimed that Walsh "in
his four interim reports to Congress included most, if not all, of the 6(e) material now disclosed in
the Final Report." In re North (Omnibus Order), 16 F.3d at 1244. This was a whopper. See 2
LAvRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS 489-721 (publishing the full text of each of Walsh's four statutorily authorized interim
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Report along with the responses of the persons named in it, gave litigants five
days to withdraw any sealed pleadings they had filed expate in the Special
Division.7' Notwithstanding the December 1992 expiration of the 1987
independent counsellaw, the grandfathered Special Division thus contributed to
the politically polarized climate that had come to surround Walsh, his
investigative work, the independent counsel statute itself, the Special Division as
a feature of the law, and as its roost, the federal judiciary from which it sprang.
E. Demise
The reenactment of the statute in June 1994 brought us the latest
controversies that we know too well. Judge Sentelle continued to serve at that
time as the Special Division's Presiding Judge, a position he still holds today.72
Within weeks of the law's return, the Special Division acted upon Attorney
General Reno's request that it appoint a "Whitewater" independent counsel. It
did so by rejecting her recommendation that it continue the assignment of Robert
B. Fiske, Jr., the independent Whitewater investigator who had been working
with his own staff within the Department ofJustice since January 1994.
Instead of appointing Fiske, the Special Division reportedly tried to find
another lawyer of high stature who would take the job and did not have the
baggage of previously having been chosen to investigate President Clinton by his
own Attorney General. After former Senator Warren B. Rudman reportedly
turned the job (or at least a job feeler) down,73 the Special Division appointed
reports, none of which contained a scrap of grand jury information). In fact, as Judge Sentelle
disclosed deep within the opinion, tbe SiedalDivision had taken the Final Report that Walsh had
given to it under seal, with grand jury information dearly identified, in August 1993 and given it
without restriction (perhaps without considering the implications of doing so) to persons who were
named therein. See In ir North (Omnibus Order), 16 F.3d at 1244. These recipients of course
shared the Report with, or described it to, others, resulting in a series of media stories that contained
fragmentary, semi-accurate descriptions of the Walsh Final Report while it was still under court seal.
See id at 124041, 1244-45.
71. See In reNorth (Emergency Motion of Soc'y of Prof.'IJoumalists, et al.), 21 F.3d at 435-
36. After the five-day period, the Special Division opened its now redacted docket and unsealed
all motions and related papers it had received pertaining to the release of Walsh's Final Report. See
id at 434. While there is no way for an outsider to know whether exparte pleadings were considered
by the Special Division and then withdrawn without a trace during the five-day period, it is striking
and suggestive that the final public record contains no submission of any kind by the named and
very aggressively represented subject of Walsh's appointment, Lt Col. Oliver L. North.
72. Cf WilmSafia e See-Nohing CongsN.Y. TiMEsJune 23,1994, atA23 (quotingJudge
Sentelle's explanation that although the 1987 independent counsel law had expired in December
1992, the Special Division was "ongoing[,] ... grandfathered by the need to supervise previously
appointed Independent Counsel").
73. See Jerry Seper, Stair sgs he'll build on work by Fihke; ?lany' aidks my stmy on job, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, atA3 (reporting that "Congressional sources said Mr. Starr... was one of
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Judge Sentelle's former D.C. Circuit colleague and President Bush's former
Solicitor General in the Department of Justice, Kenneth W. Starr. The Starr
appointment was criticized strongly and immediately by persons who tended to
be Democrats and/or allied with or generally supportive of President Clinton and
saw Starr as a political partisan, not an "independene counsel.74 The criticism
grew dramatically, and it expanded to encompass the Special Division itself, when
it became known that Judge Sentelle had lunch with his old friends from their
shared home state of North Carolina, Senators Jesse Helms and Lauch Faircloth,
who were vocal critics of Mr. Fiske and/or his Whitewater investigations,s
shortly before the Special Division effectively replaced Fiske with Star.76 The
appearance problems grew worse when Judge Sentelle's wife was hired six
months later to work as a receptionist in Senator Faircloth's Capitol Hill office.77
Citizens soon filed ethics complaints against Judge Sentelle based on these
events."8 Perhaps in response to these issues and criticisms, the Judges of the
two men under consideration for the independent counsel position. The court, according to these
sources, also talked with former Sen. Warren Rudman, New Hampshire Republican, who left office
in 1992'.
74. See, e.g.,Ruth Marcus & Rebecca Fowler, StarrUqedTo Declne CounselPost; CntonsLaaYer
CritidzesAppointee's Stance onJones Suit, WASH. POST, Aug. 8,1994, at Al (reporting the comments
of Robert S. Bennett, President Clinton's personal defense lawyer in the civil suit that PaulaJones
had filed against him); Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, Bad Appication of the Independent Counsel Law,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1994, at A18 (letter to the editor) (calling Starr "a highly partisan
Republican"). Over time, others have echoed these criticisms by defense attorneys and politicians.
See, e.g., Richard Harwood, supra note 58 (calling Starr "an ardent Republican"); Susan Low Bloch,
Cleaning Up the Legal Debris Left in the Wake of Whitewater, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 779, 782-83 (1999)
(callingJustice Scalia "incredibly prophetic" for speculating in his 1988 Morrison v. Olson dissenting
opinion about the danger ofa Special Division being politically partisan and picking an independent
counsel who was antagonistic to his or her named subject and his or her administration).
75. See, e.g., Howard Schneider, Senate Banking Panel Tuns to Foster Death; No New Evidence
Emergesin Testimony, WASH. PoST,July 30,1994, atA7 (quoting Senator Faircioth's assertion, during
a hearing regarding the death of White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster, that "[t]he cover-up
continues"; Fiske had concluded in June 1994 that Foster committed suicide); seegeneral# Howard
Schneider & Ruth Marcus, White House Supports Star;, Depite Misgidngs, Aides Express Acceptance,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1994, at Al (describing "conservative" criticisms of Fiske).
76. See, e.g., Marilyn W.Thompson,Most ofFiske's WhitewaterLegalStaffWon'tSere UnderStarr,
WASH. POST, Aug. 31,1994, atA4; seegenerall3 Peter M. Ryan, Counsels, Coundls and Lunch: Pwnting
Abuse of the Power to Appoint Indpendent Counsels, 144 U. PA. L Rv. 2537 (1996).
77. See Associated Press report, Senator Hires IFifi ofJudge Who Ousted 1" Whitevater Counsel,
CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 1,1995, at 4; see also Co-Dopendent Counsels, THE NATION, Jan. 5,1998, at 3.
78. See Toni Locy, Citien Coplaint Fikd Over Starr Appointment; Judge s Rok ,_Questioned in
Whitewater Case, WASH. POST, Sept 3,1994, at A4. These complaints were rejected by reviewing
judges. See Matter of a Charge ofJudicial Misconduct or Disability, 141 F.3d 3-33 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Edwards, CJ.); Matter of a Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Edwards, C.J.); see also In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct or Disability, 170 F.3d 1152 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (Edwards, C.J.) (dismissing complaint that an unnamedJudge of the United States Court
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Special Division for the first time began to explain publicly their statutory duties
and the nature of their work 9
In 1998 and 1999, the "end game" for the Special Division included events
that raised more questions and issues. In July 1998, the Special Division issued
an order, under seal and in an exparte proceeding, granting Independent Counsel
Starr, in the event he determined that he was required to act pursuant to the
mandatory "impeachment reporting" provision of the independent counsel law,
generic permission to transmit secret grand jury information to the Members of
the United States House of Representatives.' Without such court permission,
the Members would not have been authorized to receive this information under
the grand jury secrecy rule of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)."1 This
judicial permission-which Starr arguably should have sought from ChiefJudge
Norma HollowayJohnson of the United States District Court of the District of
Columbia, who was handling other grand jury-related motions and litigations
arising from Starr's work at the time, rather than the Special Division--was not
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had engaged in misconduct by participating, as a
Judge of the Special Division, in matters pertaining to the conduct of his former colleague Kenneth
W. Starr); seeiffra notes 83-89 and accompanying text for further information regarding this Special
Division matter, which was commenced by the Landmark Legal Foundation.
79. See Remarks ofSpecial DivisionJudges David B. Sentelle andJohn D. Butzner, appearing
as Panel Two -Appointment of Independent Counsel, in The Indeendent CounelProcers. IsItBroken
and How Shoumld It Be Fixed?, A Fiw-PanelProgra Prsented at the Opning Sesion of/the Peeding ofthe
67t Judicial Conferene of the Fourh Circuit,June 27,1997, 54 WAsH. & LEE L REv. 1515, 1536-45
(1997).
80. See Order, In ta Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div.
July 7, 1998) (per wdam) (filed under seal), reprinted in Starr Referral Appendices part 1, Tab B, at
10.
81. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (directing that an attorney for the government, such as
Independent Counsel Starr, "shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as
otherwise provided for in these rules"). Although the mandatory impeachment reporting provision
of the independent counsel law is silent regarding how it relates to the rules of federal grand jury
secrecy, which predate its enactment and generally prevent federal prosecutors from providing
grand jury information to Members of Congress, see 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994), the statute can be
read to create a reporting duty that encompasses grand jury secrets. On that reading, an
independent counsel would not need to obtain any court's permission before including grand jury
secrets in a referral of potential impeachment information to the House of Representatives. By
seeking court permission to include grand jury information in his 1998 report to the House
regarding President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, Starr implicitly read Rule 6(e) broadly and, in
this respect, the independent counsel act more narrowly.
82. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 594(k)(3)(B)(1994) (directing that, after an independent counsel has
complied with the statutory requirement to transfer all office records to the Archivist of the United
States, the Archivist "shall" disclose any grand jury records therein to the Department of Justice
"only by order of the courtofjuridiction under rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure")
(emphasis added); but c. In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367,1373-76 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div.
1989) (percudam) (holding that, at the end ofan independent counsel investigation where the Special
2000)
Widener Law Symposium Journal
tied by the Special Division to any particular showing Starr had made or limited
in time. It was, instead, a blank check with no expiration date. The Special
Division told Starr that he was free to give any grand jury information to the
House of Representatives so long as it was part of a referral of possible
impeachment information. As the world well knows, Starr used this "check"
generously when he made his Clinton impeachment referral to the House just
two months later. The episode contributed to the impression that, in the highly
contentious and political atmosphere that surrounded Starr's investigation of
President Clinton, Monica Lewinsky and others, the Judges of the Special
Division were on Starr's side.
A second late controversy arose in early 1999 when the Landmark Legal
Foundation, a litigation and advocacy organization that has tended to support
Republicans (with the notable exceptions of Independent Counsel Walsh and
Department of Justice special counsel Fiske) and to oppose every policy and
official of the Clinton Administration, 3 petitioned the Special Division to
prohibit the Department of Justice from pursuing its announced plans to
investigate the conduct of Starr and his staff.' According to Landmark lawyers,
they were simply asking the Special Division to "exercis [e] its own traditional and
statutory powers to ensure the integrity of the independent counsel investigative
process.""5 The Special Division did not pause to evaluate Landmark's standing
to seek Special Division action or its own authority to take any particular action.
Instead, the Special Division promptly and without explanation ordered both
Starr and the Department ofJustice to submit briefs addressing the Department's
power to investigate an independent counsel and, related to it, the Special
Division's authority to issue a writ of prohibition against the Department
investigating the Independent Counsel. 6 This briefing order was interpreted
immediately as an effort by the Special Division to get the Department to back
off from its threats to take action against Starry After receiving such criticism,
Division is very familiar with the "massive record," it is better suited than is the grand jury-
empaneling court to balance a grand jury witness's need for the transcript of his grand jury
testimony against the need for continued grand jury secrecy, and that the Special Division thus may
grant such a witness's motion for the transcript of his grand jury testimony).
83. See generally Landrark Legal Foundation Offidal Website, (visited Nov. 1, 1999)
<http://www.landmarklegaLorg>.
84. See InreCharge ofJudicial Misconduct or Disability, 170 F.3d at 1153-54 (describing the
course of these proceedings).
85. Richard P. Hutchison & Mark R. Levin, NJob ForAnAttony General, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 10,1999, at A17. It is not known whether Landmark had any contact with Starr or his staff
before filing this motion.
86. See Roberto Suro, Judges Get Involved In Probe Of Starr, Reno Investgation Could Be Halted,
WASH. PoST, Feb. 24, 1999, at Al (describing the Special Division's "one-sentence order").
87. See, e.g., The Spedal Division Speaks, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1999, at A18 (stating, in an
editorial, that the Special Division's order had "raised eyebrows," and that it "seemed odd and
raised the question of whether the court meant to exceed its authority by intervening').
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followed by briefs from the Department and Starr that agreed (although for
different reasons) that the Special Division should not act,88 it was the institution
that blinked. The Special Division ultimately decided that Landmark lacked
standing and, more fundamentally, that the Special Division had no legal
authority under the independent counsel law to prevent the Department from
investigating Starr's possible misconduct" The Special Division did not admit
that its briefing order had been mistaken, however, perhaps because it still did
not truly understand how any perceived judicial intervention on Starr's behalf
was, in the climate of early 1999, destined to be perceived immediately as a
political, rather than a judicial, act.
A final Special Division-related controversy, which in fact occurred after the
independent counsel lawhad expired onJune 30,1999, was the SpecialDivision's
August 1999 decision not to remove Independent Counsel Starr from office.'
This decision, for the first time since 1994, split the Special Division panel. The
majority, comprised of Judges Sentelle and Peter T. Fay, apparently based their
decision that Star's work was not so substantially completed that it could be
turned over to the Department of Justice on a casual conversation between
Sentelle and Starr.91 Starr reportedly told Judge Sentelle that he was still
investigating and, when Judge Sentelle reported that statement to his Special
Division colleagues, that apparentlywas enough ofa basis forJudges Sentelle and
Fay to conclude that Starr's employment should continue. These Judges
explicitly refused to seek any additional information from Independent Counsel
Starr, which provoked a bitter dissent from Circuit Judge Richard Cudahy.92
88. See Robert L Jackson, Reno Defemdr Imgation of Starr Pr0o, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9,1999,
at A14 (describing the Department's brief criticizing the Special Division's intervention into its
review of misconduct allegations against Independent Counsel Starr);Mr. StrmrandMs. Reno, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 1999, at A22 (describing, in an editorial, the Department ofJustice and Office of
Independent Counsel Starr briefs).
89. See Ii reMadison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 173 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1999) (per
cudiam) (filed March 18, 1999).
90. See In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1999) (per
owdam).
91. See id at 653 ("the Division has inquired of the independent counsel and received his
assurance that his work is ongoing"); id at 654 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("The only word which is
available to me of the Independent Counsel's possible investigative prospects are very general
representations that such prospects may exist, conveyed in an informal 'contact' between the
Independent Counsel and the PresidingJudge of this Division.").
92. See ii at 653-54. Judge Cudahy wrote the following.
Despite the very high esteem in which I hold the PresidingJudge [Sentelle],
I do not believe that vague intimations informally conveyed are an adequate
basis for our official action. I strongly believe that the Division needs more
information - of the specific kind identified in the statute - in order to make
its decision [whether to terminate Independent Counsel Starr's appointment].
In any event, based on what I know (or do not know) now, there is a strong
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Judge Cudahy's opinion went beyond that procedural dispute, however, and
stated his belief in flatly political terms that the Senate's acquittal of President
Clinton justified the termination of Independent Counsel Starr.93 Starr correctly
responded, in a press release, thatJudge Cudahy had overlooked the areas of his
jurisdiction and continuing activity that had nothing to do with Monica Lewinsky
or any matter that was part of President Clinton's impeachment.94
III. Is THERE A FUTURE FOR PROSECUTORIAL "AppOINTMENT... IN
THE COURTS OF LAW"?95
In Watergate, ChiefJudgeJohn Sirica and other federal judges were among the
heroes who helped to "make the system work." 6 In the tumult of 1973 and
case for termination, and it would be very difficult to persuade me otherwise.
Id at 654.
The respective testimony ofJudges Sentelle and Cudahy to a Senate Committee only months
earlier presaged this dispute. On April 14,1999, the three Special Division judges (Judges Sentelle,
Fay and Cudahy) testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. In response to
questions, Judge Cudahy testified that the Special Division could, in his view, "play an important
role... in determining when investigations ought to come to an end.' The Fdtute of the Indtpndent
CounselAct Hearings Btfor the Senate Comm. on GovrnmentalAffairs, 106th Cong. 474 (1999). Judge
Sentelle noted that he "might disagree with [his] colleague,Judge Cudahy, and say that since we are
not a supervisor, I do not think we are well suited to make that determination absent a proceeding
initiated eitherby the I[ndependent] C[ounsel], the Attorney General or someone who is the subject
of the investigation." Id at 477. Judge Sentelle also stated that the Special Division had historically
carried out its statutory responsibility under 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) to determine periodicallywhether
an independent counsel's work was substantially completed simply by "inquir[ing] of the
Independent Counsel for response on that" Id at 495. Judge Fay stated his agreement that "[w]e
really have to rely on what the Independent Counsel tells us...." Id at 496. Judge Cudahy dosed
the colloquy on this topic by expressing his hope that the Special Division "can approach these
things on an informal basis, some kind of a middle ground with Independent Counsel as to the
question of termination, rather than just resorting to formal procedures." Id at 497.
93. See In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.3d at 654.
94. See Statement issued by Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Office ofthe Independent
Counsel Web Site, (visited Nov. 5,1999) <http://www.oicstarr.com>.
95. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 ('the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper,... in the Courts of Law").
96. "The system worked" is a phrase that vastly oversimplifies the story of "Watergate"
which was not a single, easily resolved event and was not handled simply by a "system" of
governmental structures. The phrase also is a construct of hindsight, because it starts with history's
knowledge of who turned out to be the bad guys of Watergate. Cf. JIMMY BRESLIN, How THE
GOOD GuYs FINALLY WON: NOTES FROM AN IMPEACHMENT SuMMER (1975). Although
proponents ofindependent counsel legislation followingWatergate might be seen as dissenters from
the perspective that the phrase depicts-on this view, their support for new statutory mechanisms
following Watergate indicates their understanding that "it' turned out as it did based on unique
facts, individual personalities and a fair amount ofluck-I use the phrase here because the framers
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1974, these judges, acting as judges through the lawful processes of the federal
courts, helped the Watergate Special Prosecutors succeed in their investigations
of President Nixon97 and their prosecutions of his co-conspirators and others."
Following Watergate, Congress and the Carter Administration tried to craft an
independent counsel statute with institutional mechanisms that would be, when
it next was needed, comparably effective. The 1978 independent counsel law
specifically provided for a new role for some of the Article Im successors to the
judicial heroes of Watergate. A special court, comprised of three senior federal
judges who would be picked specially by the Chief Justice of the United States,
would appoint the persons who would serve as independent counsel in the
cases-the next Watergates-where such appointments were required. These
judges, comprising a Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, also would define each independent counsel's
area(s) of jurisdiction and attend to various administrative matters arising during
an independent counsel's work. The Special Division thus would provide a
judicial imprimatur and a level of ongoing protection to independent counsel as
they went forward with investigations and prosecutions of senior Executive
Branch officials and their associates.
The saga of the Special Division over the past twenty years reveals that this
well-intended legislative effort to craft substantive statutory roles for federal
judges in the independent counsel process did not work. In the early days of the
independent counsel law, the Special Division tried to perform the statutoryroles
of supervising and protecting independent counsel. This moved the Special
Division out of the law's shadows and made it a topic of constitutional and
of the independent counsel law clearly sought to codify for the future a system comprised of the
things, including the constructive roles played by federal judges, that they had seen work in
Watergate.
97. Set, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also xbra notes 16-19 and
accompanying text The judges also transmitted from aWatergate grand jury to the HouseJudiciary
Committee a "roadmap" describing the grand jury's evidence against Nixon. See In re Report &
Recommendation ofJune 5,1972 GrandJury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to the House
of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) (Sirica, C.J.), affidsub nom. Haldeman v. Sirica,
501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also STANLEY I. KuTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE THELAsT
CRIsis OF RICHARD NIXON 461-63, 465-66 (1990); RICHARD BEN-VENISTE & GEORGE
FRAMPTONJR., STONEWALL: THE REAL STORY OFTHE WATERGATE PROSECUTION 242-50,264-
65 (1977);JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE BATrLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS
COX AND JAWORSKI, A BEHIND-THE-SCENES AccouNT 284-86, 290-91, 310 (1977). The
Committee's votes to impeach the President were part of the collapsing political and public support
that led to his resignation from office. Seegenera4JOHN OSBORNE, THE LAST NIXON WATCH
(1975).
98. See gentrah4 JOHN J. SIIUCA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. THE BREAK-IN, THE
TAPES,THE CONSPIRATORS,THE PARDON (1979); LEONJAWoRSKi,THERIGHTANDTHEPOWER:
THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE 280-92 (1976) (Appendix a: Status Report of Cases');
WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT (Oct. 1975).
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political controversy. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Monison v.
Olson,99 which made it clear that Special Division "supervision" ofan independent
counsel's investigative and prosecutorial work raised grave constitutional issues,
the Special Division became somewhat less involved in the ongoing work of
independent counsel. The Special Division still did get involved episodically,
however, apparently depending on its substantive views of a particular
independent counsel and the precise issue that he or she was confronting. In
various moments, the Special Division appeared to be working aggressively on
behalf of an independent counsel's investigations and prosecutions (the Judge
MacKinnon-led court supporting Lawrence Walsh), then to be undercutting an
independent counsel's work (the Judge Sentelle-led court maligning Walsh), then
to be defending another independent counsel who was investigating a President
of the opposite political party (the Sentelle-led court appointing Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate 'Whitewater" and then supporting his work
in various contexts), and then itself to be fracturing as it assessed the merit and
propriety of an independent counsel's conduct (udge Cudahy dissenting from
his colleagues' handling of their review in 1999 of whether Starr should be
continued in office or teminated). Questions also arose about why the Chief
Justice picked particular judges to serve on the Special Division, embroiling him
in questions about partisan politics in the judiciary. Overall, the Special
Division's role seemed not to contribute to the independence or credibility of
independent counsel as they carried out their responsibilities. The Special
Division's activities did, by contrast, prompt questions and cynicism about the
credibility and independence of its own members, and about federal judges
generally. Ironically, perceptions regarding the Special Division thus impaired the
public confidence in government that the independent counsel statute was
supposed to enhance.
Is there a better way to proceed? One quick response is that we have already
found one. We now are in a transition to living without an independent counsel
law."° As this experiment moves ahead, there wi be no Special Division, 1 and
thus no controversy will emanate from or swirl around federal judges appointing
and interacting with prosecutors of high Executive Branch officials. At some
point, however, if Attorney General-supervised investigations of these officials
lose enough credibility in the eyes of Congress and the generalpublic, our current
99. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
100. The law expired on June 30, 1999. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (providing that the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994 "shall cease to be effective five years after [its]
date of enactment," which was June 30,1994). It does, however, "continue in effect with respect
to then pending matters before an Independent Counsel that in the judgment of such Counsel
require such continuation until that Independent Counsel determines such matters have been
completed." Id
101. The Special Division will cease to exist when the last of the extant independent counsel
completes his or her work Cf. 4m note 72.
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hiatus from court-appointed independent counsel may be ended by renewal of
the independent counsel law. History suggests that this kind of climate shift is
likely. If it comes, the new consensus will be one that has grown out of
dissatisfaction with prosecutions and investigations under direct Department of
Justice supervision. This new view is thus likely to favor greater judiial
supervision of these investigations, just as public and legislative opinion did
following the Saturday Night Massacre of October 1973, and in enacting the
independent counsel statutes that began in 1978.
Whenever the time does come to consider new independent counsel
legislation, the challenge will be to define processes to appoint and empower
good independent counsel without involving federal judges too much in
controversy-attracting roles and responsibilities outside their regular domain
under Article III. A more modest independent counsel law could employ federal
judges only as independent counsel-pickers. This kind of law could make the
judges such one-time players by explicitly eliminating the work-reviewing,
jurisdiction-expanding, report-receiving, fee-awarding, and other functions that
have kept the existing Special Division entwined in each independent counsel's
work. Such a statute also could make the judicial task of picking someone to
serve as independent counsel much more mechanical and less discretionary. The
law could require a panel of judges to make their independent counsel selection
from a pre-approved list generated by another Branch of government 02 It could
also direct the judges to confer on that appointee exactly and only the
investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction that the Attorney General had asked
the court to confer. The law also could define a process that would rotate
responsibility for serving on this court randomly among senior Circuit Judges,
eliminating the Chief Justice's participation in this process and thus conserving
his time and credibility for his own Article III judging. A future statute also
would limitits imposition on the appointing judges and on the judiciary generally
if it raised the threshold for mandatory independent counsel appointments03
A future statute that defined this reduced role for the federal judges who
appoint independent counsel would preserve the valuable fact and appearance of
not having a President or his Attorney General select the person who would
review serious allegations that the President or one of his intimates violated
federal criminal law. In this limited respect, the law would trade on and, in terms
of the independence and credibility of an independent counsel, it would hope to
benefit from, the imprimatur and the independence of federal judges. It would
not, however, spend the capital and risk the credibility of federal judges by
102. The law could direct the judges to obtain this list from the Attorney General, the
President, Congress or any number of combinations therefrom.
103. For fuller descriptions of some proposals along the lines described in the preceding
paragraph of text, see The FPur of the Itependent Counsel Ad, Hearings Before the Committee on
GovernmentalAffairs, UnitedState Senate, 106th Cong. 283-90 (1999) (testimonyjohn Q. Barrett), and
Barrett, subra note 24, at 643-50.
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making the independent counsel a person who the judges had identified and
recruited solely on their own. It also would not place the judges and the judiciary
at further risk by involving them at all with independent counsel after they had
been appointed. This kind of law would make it dearer than its predecessor
statutes did that an independent counsel, who performs Executive Branch
functions of criminalinvestigation and prosecution, is subject only to the ultimate
supervision of the President, the Attorney General or any other Executive
Branch official who is given, by statute, the power to remove the independent
counsel."°
After all the tinkering and improving is done, however, any independent
counsel statute or the absence of one will still be a "system" that works only as
well as the people who comprise that system choose to conduct themselves. We
cannot identify today who they will be or imagine the particular controversial
matters in which they will be protagonists. What we can know, based on the
experiences of Watergate, Iran/Contra and Whitewater, is that the next
independent counsel-worthy case also will be, under any investigative system, a
national nightmare."s This case will involve, challenge and perhaps even bedevil
the government officials who become subjects of the investigation, the Attorney
General who decides that the investigation should be assigned outside of ordinary
Department of Justice channels, the independent counsel or special prosecutor
who gets assigned to the matter, the federal judges who are assigned to the
resulting cases (or to perform non-Article III functions such as picking the
prosecutor), and the members of the public who will watch all of this unfold
within their government.
In planning for this future, we should learn from our experience with the
Special Division component of the independent counsel law. We should
remember that judging is, like any other aspect of governing, a very human
104. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994) ("An independent counsel... may be removed from
office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney
General and only for good cause, physical or mental disability (if not prohibited by law protecting
persons from discrimination on the basis of such a disability), or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties.").
105. Judge Laurence Silberman-himselfa veteran, as Deputy Attorney General, ofWatergate
and its immediate aftermath-made this prescient observation for himself and Judge Stephen
Wiliams in 1988, when Kenneth Starr was their judicial colleague and Monica Lewinsky was only
fourteen years old:
The Watergate crisis is, of course, the [independent counsel] statute's genesis
and it is in order to spare the country a repetition of that "long national
nightmare" that the statute has been enacted. That justification assumes,
wrongly we think, thatprosecutingPresidents can somehow be made relatively
painless. We do not see how such an eventuality can, no matter what
structural techniques are employed, be other than a national nightmare.
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 506 (D.C. Cir.), rw'd sub nora. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988).
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enterprise. We should do what we can to craft systems that preserve institutional
strengths, minimize costs and risks, and avoid temptations to real or apparent
partiality.
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Table I:
The Judges of the Special Division and their
Independent Counsel Appointees, 1978-1999
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ludicial Term Presidiir ludze judge Jud-
10/26/1978 Chieflustice Designee #1: Chieflustice Desicnee #2: Chiefjustice Desinee #3:
-10/26/1980 Judge Roger Robb Judge J. Edward Lumbard Judge Lewis R. Morgan
(D.C. Circuit) (2d Circuit) (sth Circuit; 11th Circuit)
Independent Counsel
AMpointed:b
Arthur H. Christy IirnHamiltonJordan 11/29/1979 -5/28/1980'
GeraldJ. Gallinghouse InmTiothy Kraft 9/9/1980- 3/1981







Leon Silverman Is n Raymond Donovan (1) 12/29/1981 - 9/1982







Jacob A. Stein Is n Edwin Meese III 4/2/1984-9/20/1980
10/26/1984 judge Robb' Chief justice Desinee #4: Judge Morgan
-10/26/1986 Judge Walter R. Mansfield





Leon Silvemman Im nyRaynmd Donovan (U) 6/11/1985 -11/30/1988
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Chief lustice Designee #5: Judge Mansfield Judge Morgan







James C. McKay I# ir Theodore B. Olson 4/23/1986 -5/28/869
Alexia Morrison Is r Theodore B. Olson 5/ 29 / 1 98 6h - 3/14/1989
Whitney N. SeymourJr. Ix n Michael Deaver 5/29/1986 - 8/16/1989








Lawrence E. Walsh Is fr Oliver I North 12/19/1986 - 1/18/1994
Cad Rauh b1* nrW. Lawrence Wallace 12/29/1986- 3/30/19871
Judge MacKinnon Chief lustice Designee #6: Judge Morgan











James C. McKay Ia ir Franklyn Nof~iger & 2/2/1987 - 7/5/1988 °
Is ir Edwin Meese III (I)
James Harper" Ix r W. Lawrence Wallace 8/17/1987 - 12/17/1987P
10/26/1988 fudee MacKinnon Judge Pell Chief lustice Desinee #7:
-10/26/1990 JudgeJohn D. Butzner








Dan K. Webb' Im e James W. Cicconi 5/1989 -8/1989
Adin M. Adams It n Samuel Il. Pierce,Jr. 3/1/1990-7/3/1995r
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Donald T. Bucldin' [sealed and not reported] 4/1991 - 4/1992
10/26/1992 Chief justice Designee #8: Chief justice Designee #9: Judge Butzncr
-10/26/1994 Judge David B. Sentelle JudgeJoseph T. Sneed







Joseph B. diGenova Im trJanet G. Mullins 12/14/1992-1/1/1996
10/26/1994 Judge Sentell¢ Chieflustice Desinee #10: Judge Butzner
-10/26/1996 Judge Peter T. Fay






Kenneth W. Starr Ix r Madison Guaranty S&L 8/5/1994 - 10/18/1999-
Donald C. Smaltz Is r Alphonso Mike Espy 9/9/1994 - present
David M. Barrett Ia ir Henry G. Cisneros 5/24/1995 - present
Larry D. Thompson" Ix r Samuel R. PierceJr. 7/3/1995 - 10/27/1998'
Daniel S. Pearson Ix e Ronald H. Brown 7/6/1995 - 11/14/1996'
Michael F. Zeldind Ix reJanet G. Mullins 1/1996 - 6/1996












Curtis F_ von Kann INrn!Eli Segal 11/27/1996 -12/19/1997'
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10/26/1998 Judge Sentelle Judge Fay Chief lustice Designee
-10/26/2000 #11:
Independent Counsel Judge Richard D. Cudahy







Carol Elder Bruce Is n Bruce Edward Babbitt 3/19/1998 - present
Ralph I. Lancaster,Jr. Im rr Alexis M. Herman 5/26/1998- present
Robert W. Ray- Im ra Madison Guaranty S&L 10/18/1999 -present
a. Unless otherwise noted, the ChiefJustice of the United States designated and assigned each judge who has
served on the Special Division to a term beginning on October 26 of an even-numbered year and expiring on October 26
in the next even-numbered year.
b. The information in this Table regarding Independent Counsel appointments builds upon the very helpfiul and
comprehensive data that Professor Kathleen Clark assembled in 1997. See Kathleen Clark, Pgrig the PdaforHdihtesedEthia
StmU' Leti D efeeFusdt ad Or Watqy That C tr~em t Offidak Pay Their Lmyner, 50 Stanford L Rev. 65,127-29 (1997)(rable I, 'Targets, Dates, and Costs of Independent Counsel Investigations). The information in this Table also been
checked against the publicly-available information in the Clerk's Office at the United States Court ofAppeals for the District
of Columbia Cireuit.
c. Christy filed his Final Report on this date. SeeArthur lL Christy, TraadTdb hoaofteFirs SpdaPn.rueaor
Uxdtrthe Ethics isi Gornumxwta Sf1978, 86 Georgetown LJ. 2287,2288 & n.3 (1998).
d. Stein's Final Report was released publicly on this date.
e. Judge Robb apparently served until his death on December 19,1985. SeeJ.Y. Smith, CoartofApeaJurjdRoger
Robb Dies at 79; Naxed to BeNch ix 1969, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1985, at D10.
f FollowingJudge Robb's death, ChiefJustice Burger designated Judge MacKinnon to serve as PresidingJudge
of the Special Division.
& McKay resigned due to a possible conflict of interest. See Mary Thomton, lieakdeat Comeee.Quir to Avoid
CaaXd; D~taatf WillPurue Car o Withheld EPA Deutt, Wash. Post, May 30,1986, at A17 (quoting McKay's statement,
which w reeased by the Speal Division, thathe was resigningbecause "the appeaance ofa conflict ofinterest conceivablymay exsi~arue o fadwicegiven by another member ofmay firm [Covington &Burng] in an area whichmght be considered
to have a relationshp to tis investigation").h. Morrison, who had served as McKay's deputy, was appointed to replace him following his resignation. Ii!
. Although Rauh's appointment remains under court seal, both his identity and the named subject of his
investigation have been reportedly publicly. See, e g, Aaron Freiwald,JudeLbbidCouesltoRttaaoaProbLegalTmeaApr.
20, 1987, at 2.j. Judge Mansfield served until his death on Januasy 7,1987. See Dennis Hevesi, WFalterR. Maxdfl4 Fetde!Jxdj6Is Dadat 75, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 8,1987, at B12.
k. Walsh's Final Report was relesed publicly on this date.I. Rah and his staff resgned when the Department ofJustice announced its interpretation that federal conflict
of interest laws barred an independent counsel and his or her private law firm colleagues from representing clients before
the Departmnt. See Aaro.n Freiwald, . ra note i (describing a March 25,1987, letter to this effect that Independent Counsel
,eu, nn.receive from Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper). The Department subsequently abandoned this retroactive
legal interpretation See Aaron Freiwald, NwvPrsseator T.ak Over W/a..a/.Pr h', Legal Times, Dec. 7,1987, at 4.Harper was appointed to suceed R uh following his resgnaion. Although Harper's appontmentremainsunder
court sea, b o is ient ty an da the named subject of his ives ga on have been reported pub ly. S, e,., Ruth M arcus,
Juatkr OJ~aa wl-I. CA dx Tax Ca e, W ash. POS , Dee. 19,1987, at 3; Freiwald, .1, s note i
n. FollowingJudge Mansfildd's death, Chief Justie Rehnquist designated Judge Pll to serve as a Judge of the
Special Division.
k. McKay's Final Report was filed with the Special Division on this date.
p. Harper filed his Final Report on this day. e Marens,irannote i.
of. .q- Although Webb's appointment remains under court seal, both his identity and the named subject of his
vest igaton ave been repo ted publicly. ee, e George LardnerJr., B eartmentsubeqdfEtysAbadatod , Wash. Post,
Sept. 6,S1989, at A8.
r. Adams resigned on this date.
c . Although Bucldin's appointment remains under court seal, his service as an independent counsel has been
reported publicly. See Press Release of Senator Fred Thompson, Thompmox Naxes Ttip, Buckia to Nwv Iasstgat,ox Posts, Apr.
10, 1997 (available on LEXIS) (reporting that "[i]n 1991 he [Bucklini served as an Independent Counsel pursuant to the
t ics in ovem m en t Ac "); b e a m Robe rt Schmidt, hen t Start pot illBe$tored Legal T ues, Aug. 17, 1998, at 10
C'.ike Star, Bucklin has asobeen anindependeant counsel. AleoughBucstnwasappointed in 1991 sdworked i n 1992,
te target o. Mvesigation as re fined seed d by the special appeals pane that oversees independent counseL").
. DiGenova resigned on this date. His Final Report had been released publicly on November 30,1995.
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U. Thompson was appointed to succeed dais at the time ot'his resignation.
v. Zeldin was appointed to succeed diGenova, who had resigned following the public release ofhis Final Report.
See mom note t.
w. Starr resigned on this date.
x. The combined Final Report of Independent Counsel Adams and Thompson was filed on this date.
y. Pearson's Final Report was filed on this date.
z. Von Kann's Final Report was filed on this date.
aa. Ray was appointed to succeed Star at the time of his resignation.
